Showing posts with label rachel proefke. Show all posts
Showing posts with label rachel proefke. Show all posts
Monday, June 16, 2008

Article #2 from Volume 1, Issue 4: Your Media, Your Human Right

“Reconciliation as Grassroots Justice”
Rachel Proefke

Between April and July of 1994, in the span of 100 days, an estimated one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were butchered throughout Rwanda as the rest of the world watched passively. The brutal genocide was orchestrated by the use of the propagandist radio station Radio Mille Collines; instigated in the shadows by the government; and enflamed by an inauspicious plan crash blamed on Tutsis which killed Rwanda’s President.

Most of the killings were perpetrated by civilians against unarmed civilians in vicious attacks of neighbors and community members acting out murder and destruction on a largely innocent minority and their supporters. This event is significant for the sheer efficiency and magnitude by which so many lives were extinguished.

Also, its significance is manifested in the fact that this was not the first outbreak of violence between Tutsis and Hutus, but rather one of the more glaring instances in a greater history of ethnicized tension in both Rwanda and Burundi where both sides are guilty of transgressions.

In the aftermath of the genocide, while the rest of the world wrestles with its complicit inaction, Rwandans are left with the questions of justice, truth, memory, and reconciliation.
Grappling with more than 120,000 alleged genocidaires placed in Rwanda’s prisons and communal jails by 2000, and despite the instituting of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, reconciliation and justice have been sought by other means.

Human Rights Watch conceded that the combination of the national courts and the ICTR managed to try 10,000 suspects in a decade, but at this rate it is projected that it would take upwards of 100 years to prosecute all the suspects. In a throwback to traditional community and tribal justice systems, a means to deal with Rwanda’s wounds has been presented in the form of the Gacaca court system.

According to the official Rwandan government website of the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, the Gacaca courts system is the manifestation of endeavors to reconstruct what happened during the genocide, speed up the legal proceedings by using as many courts as possible, and promote reconciliation of all Rwandans to build their unity.

Traditionally, Gacaca courts were community assemblies presided by elders which would settle village and family disputes.

However, in their modern manifestation, these grass-roots courts, as their name implies, are overseen by individuals with judicial training and act as a forum for the community to discuss the local context of the genocide and prosecute local offenders on four categories of criminality- organizational capacity in the genocide, perpetrators of homicide, committing acts of serious bodily injury, and property damage.

There are no lawyers present at the trials; instead, community members are welcome to comment or intervene as they see fit on either the side of or against the defendant. While instituted primarily to speed up the process of justice within the small, mountainous African nation, instead the courts have been attested as the primary agents for reconciliation, truth, and memory at the local level.

This complements the community-based nature of the genocide itself where neighbors are the perpetrators and where communities must conceive of a means to negotiate their relationships.

The Gacaca courts are often touted as the most sweeping implementation of the ideological assumptions behind the necessity of truth and reconciliation. However, they are often criticized as well for potential biases, inefficiencies, needlessly exposing witnesses and victims to reprisal, and inadequacies of coping with such a complex historical and socio-political context larger than the locality.

Others in turn retort with the notion that these faults are the “occupational hazards” of truth and reconciliation as opposed to conventional retributive justice systems. The question remains how is justice to be conceived of and achieved in the context of such widespread brutality? What is the function of locality in reconciliation following crimes against humanity? And how do we repatriate a sense of community and peace after such broad transgressions?

Despite the persistence of these subjectively-oriented questions, at the very least, the Gacaca courts are occupying the gaps in accountability, speed, and resolution that international justice following the genocide has left gaping. They can be conceived of as healing the wounds that complicit international passivity allowed to be inflicted. Perhaps the best way to secure justice for community-based and widespread crimes is through respect for this locality, as opposed to through the very mechanisms of justice and protection which failed to resolve the issue before over one million civilians were brutally butchered.
Friday, June 13, 2008

Article #4 from Volume 1, Issue 2: The Many Places of Immigration

“Botswana Policies in the Context of the Zimbabwe Crisis: Immigration Issues”

Rachel Proefke


Illegal border crossings, fences along the border, the issue of migrant labor, concerns of job market saturation, xenophobia…These words most likely conjure thoughts of the situation of Mexican immigration in America. However, these words also reflect the situation of the immigration debate in Botswana, especially in light of the economic crisis in neighboring Zimbabwe.


Botswana, a small country in Southern Africa, is notable for its economic progress and remarkable political stability since decolonization. After gaining independence from Britain in 1966, Botswana rapidly transitioned from a migrant-sending nation to a migrant-receiving nation. Originally supplying South Africa’s gold and diamond mines with labor, it now attracts both permanent and temporary immigrants from nearby nations who have achieved less political and economic success.


Helped by the discovery of rich diamond veins in the 1970s, and by an aggressive policy of immigrant attraction, Botswana has achieved sustained progress. This success has only further attracted immigrants from South Africa, Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe during times of political unrest and economic hardship.


The most recent of these is that of the situation of economic crisis in Zimbabwe. While Botswana has evolved from an under-developed nation of migrant laborers to such steadily increasing prosperity, Zimbabwe has experienced an opposite trajectory.

The southern African nation has devolved from the region’s best bet for development- a veritable economic powerhouse- to a situation of inflation that reaches close to 2,000% per year in a context of approximately 80% unemployment and critical resource shortages. Thus, since the dawn of the crisis around 2000, Zimbabwe’s economic refugees have been pouring into Botswana, by increasingly illegal means.


Botswana’s aim to decrease dependence on immigration by bolstering the national population was once manifested in the policy of gradual immigration reduction. However, the crisis in Zimbabwe, as well as mounting xenophobia in response to the influx, has engendered the increased velocity of this goal. This new isolationist sentiment is exhibited by the construction of a 500-km fence on the border to stem the tide of illegal immigrants.


However, it is not simply illegal border-runners who pose the most difficult situation but rather those who overstay their welcome. Migration between Botswana and Zimbabwe is regulated by the Immigration Act of 1966 which allows unrestricted entry of foreign nationals, who often venture into Botswana for holidays, family visits, shopping trips, trading opportunities, and who are permitted to stay for 90 days with proper documentation.

With figures ranking from 60,000 to 800,000 accounting for the number of those illegally in Botswana, most of those are a result of extended stays courtesy of this loophole. In the context of increasing xenophobia, both explicitly from the national population and implicitly embodied in government policies, the subject of these immigrants is of mounting significance in this immigration debate.


From what can be determined in this context, the issue of immigration into Botswana is not so much a question of whether migrants will enter the country but rather how they will be managed, controlled, documented, and, especially, treated and protected- if at all.


As border controls are heightened and new mechanisms of punishment conceived and implemented- mass and immediate deportation being the predilection, a rapidly exclusionary policy appears the greatest likelihood. Yet of greater consequence than the decisions of the government, and the context in which they are made, is how this will affect those already in Botswana and this legal, and at times quasi-legal, flow of temporary migrants.
Wednesday, May 28, 2008

Article #6 from Volume 1, Issue 1: Homelessness

“Internally Displaced Persons: The Scope of Their Human Rights Protections”

Rachel Proefke


We see their photos in newspapers and their faces momen­tarily plastered on TV – emaciated figures which could sooner be skeletons than humans trekking across countries and sticking arms out of barbed-wire-enclosed refugee camps. When we see them, they strike the chord of our human ethos and persuade us to consider taking action.


However, whether we take action or just think about how terrible it is, refugees alone are not the only significant aftershock of civil war, poor natural conditions, or mass persecution. The problem of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is just as notable; perhaps even more so as they do not as easily garner the same protections bequeathed to refugees by the bevy of international agreements that form the legal framework for those who cannot return to their war-shaken homelands.


We are often presented with the stories of refugees and their harrowing trials, but sometimes IDPs – at least on an individual and impacting level – are neglected. Often IDPs are solely represented through the brief statistical information of their relative numbers and do not gain the access to the spotlight that they deserve.


By remaining within sovereign borders, they remain within the repressive political structure that forced them to leave their homes in the first place. Perhaps with increas­ing significance, they will gain an increasing voice.


With civil war and genocide raging in Sudan, masses of people have been and are being forced from their homes in the south.


Some of these people will seek refuge in neighboring nations, such as Egypt, Chad, Ethiopia, and Kenya.


Others, for whom this is not a feasible option, will be trapped within the borders of Sudan, adding to the massive numbers of internationally displaced persons. Some sources report that this figure could be as high as 4 million within Sudan itself – one of the largest concentrations of IDPs in the world.


Despite the practical concerns of such an exodus and the is­sues that arise when mass groups of people are forced to subsist in whatever region of refuge they may find, there are also the legal concerns of such an increasingly prominent situation.


They entail the extent to which IDPs qualify for special protection and exactly what human rights protections these groups are entitled to. As these migrants do not qualify for refugee status, they are mostly entitled to the general protections of the international hu­man rights framework – as well as such special treaties as their nation is a party to.


In essence, their special situation denotes no special protection, such as that conferred to women, children, and refugees.


In addition to the general human rights provisions bestowed by multiple international human rights instruments, the United Nations (UN) – under the direction and suggestion of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on IDPs – adopted The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in 1998. This document relates existing human rights laws to IDPs, and seeks to extend refugee protections to them. Despite the perceived international support for this document, there is no greater accountability or enforceable mechanisms as the document is not legally binding.


The state is responsible for enforcing human rights, and it agrees with the documents that detail them and offer protec­tive mechanisms to their maintenance; with greater and more extensive rights come greater bargaining power, a more tangible sense of security, and more extensive accountability.


As IDPs gain greater numbers, their plight will gain a greater amount of attention, which will bring with it the construction of new mechanisms of protection for this neglected group.


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