Showing posts with label media control. Show all posts
Showing posts with label media control. Show all posts
Monday, June 16, 2008

Article #2 from Volume 1, Issue 4: Your Media, Your Human Right

“Reconciliation as Grassroots Justice”
Rachel Proefke

Between April and July of 1994, in the span of 100 days, an estimated one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were butchered throughout Rwanda as the rest of the world watched passively. The brutal genocide was orchestrated by the use of the propagandist radio station Radio Mille Collines; instigated in the shadows by the government; and enflamed by an inauspicious plan crash blamed on Tutsis which killed Rwanda’s President.

Most of the killings were perpetrated by civilians against unarmed civilians in vicious attacks of neighbors and community members acting out murder and destruction on a largely innocent minority and their supporters. This event is significant for the sheer efficiency and magnitude by which so many lives were extinguished.

Also, its significance is manifested in the fact that this was not the first outbreak of violence between Tutsis and Hutus, but rather one of the more glaring instances in a greater history of ethnicized tension in both Rwanda and Burundi where both sides are guilty of transgressions.

In the aftermath of the genocide, while the rest of the world wrestles with its complicit inaction, Rwandans are left with the questions of justice, truth, memory, and reconciliation.
Grappling with more than 120,000 alleged genocidaires placed in Rwanda’s prisons and communal jails by 2000, and despite the instituting of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, reconciliation and justice have been sought by other means.

Human Rights Watch conceded that the combination of the national courts and the ICTR managed to try 10,000 suspects in a decade, but at this rate it is projected that it would take upwards of 100 years to prosecute all the suspects. In a throwback to traditional community and tribal justice systems, a means to deal with Rwanda’s wounds has been presented in the form of the Gacaca court system.

According to the official Rwandan government website of the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, the Gacaca courts system is the manifestation of endeavors to reconstruct what happened during the genocide, speed up the legal proceedings by using as many courts as possible, and promote reconciliation of all Rwandans to build their unity.

Traditionally, Gacaca courts were community assemblies presided by elders which would settle village and family disputes.

However, in their modern manifestation, these grass-roots courts, as their name implies, are overseen by individuals with judicial training and act as a forum for the community to discuss the local context of the genocide and prosecute local offenders on four categories of criminality- organizational capacity in the genocide, perpetrators of homicide, committing acts of serious bodily injury, and property damage.

There are no lawyers present at the trials; instead, community members are welcome to comment or intervene as they see fit on either the side of or against the defendant. While instituted primarily to speed up the process of justice within the small, mountainous African nation, instead the courts have been attested as the primary agents for reconciliation, truth, and memory at the local level.

This complements the community-based nature of the genocide itself where neighbors are the perpetrators and where communities must conceive of a means to negotiate their relationships.

The Gacaca courts are often touted as the most sweeping implementation of the ideological assumptions behind the necessity of truth and reconciliation. However, they are often criticized as well for potential biases, inefficiencies, needlessly exposing witnesses and victims to reprisal, and inadequacies of coping with such a complex historical and socio-political context larger than the locality.

Others in turn retort with the notion that these faults are the “occupational hazards” of truth and reconciliation as opposed to conventional retributive justice systems. The question remains how is justice to be conceived of and achieved in the context of such widespread brutality? What is the function of locality in reconciliation following crimes against humanity? And how do we repatriate a sense of community and peace after such broad transgressions?

Despite the persistence of these subjectively-oriented questions, at the very least, the Gacaca courts are occupying the gaps in accountability, speed, and resolution that international justice following the genocide has left gaping. They can be conceived of as healing the wounds that complicit international passivity allowed to be inflicted. Perhaps the best way to secure justice for community-based and widespread crimes is through respect for this locality, as opposed to through the very mechanisms of justice and protection which failed to resolve the issue before over one million civilians were brutally butchered.

Article #1 from Volume 1, Issue 4: Your Media, Your Human Right


“Tibetan Buddhists Struggle for Justice”
Janice Goh

The Three Jewels, The Buddha, the Teachings, and the Spiritual Community, of Tibetan Buddhism govern the religious community of Tibetans.
Honoring the Three Jewels, the Dalai Lama composed a prayer for the people of Tibet in 1960, praying for freedom of Tibet, praying for ‘the pious people,’ praying for the spread of universal friendship and love, praying for justice. Justice, defined as the quality of being impartial and fair or simply the quality of conforming to law, has been stripped from the people of Tibet since China’s invasion in 1959.

Although China has established the Law of Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet, the implementation of the law is inconsistent with its intended agenda.
The reality in Tibet reveals a suppression of religious freedom and practices that undermines the legitimacy of the law.

Since Chairman Mao ZeDong and his Red Army invaded Tibet in 1950, Tibetans have suffered from religious suppression. Not only was this part of Mao’s Cultural Revolution that prohibited subscribing to religious ideologies, it was also his agenda to assert political control and avoid political competition from the Dalai Lama.

Prior to the Chinese invasion of Tibet, Tibet had a longstanding history of a system of government known as chos srid gnyi ldan, a combined religious and secular system under the rule of the Dalai Lama. This system had been in place since 635 AD where the Dalai Lama was seen as cho rgyal, a political leader and earthly manifestation of the Buddha of Compassion, Chenrezig.

In 1984, China promulgated the law on regional ethnic autonomy that states that Tibetans have the right to inherit and develop traditional culture as well as practice religious beliefs.
However, paralleling the economic growth in the region has been stifling social and cultural development, especially in terms of religion.

This was spearheaded by the exile of the Dalai Lama in 1959. Coupled with the exile of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 95% of the monasteries and temples in Tibet were destroyed, books were burned, and Buddhists were thrown in jail for practicing their religion. In addition, the Chinese government abolished the traditional practice of reincarnating the Panchen Lama, the second most spiritual figure in Tibet after the Dalai Lama.

When the previous Panchen Lama passed away in 1989, the Chinese government disregarded the Llhasa government’s election of the reincarnation the Panchan Lama. Rather, they elected a Panchen Lama of their choice that is now educated in Beijing, instead of receiving a traditional Buddhist education. This exemplifies a deliberate attempt to control and suppress the religious culture of the Tibetans that the international community of Tibetans and Tibet Government in Exile deem as unfair, unconstitutional, and unjust.

Today, the suppression of religion is furthered by restrictions on the freedom to become a monk in Tibet. The Chinese government places limits on the number of people who may become monks not only to limit the spread of faith but also to relieve the state’s financial burden as lamas enjoy state subsidies for food. Even if people become monks, Tibetan monks do not have the freedom to preach; Tibetan monks have rules on giving public lectures on Buddhist philosophy. If there are more than 100 people, permission must come from the commune, if there are over 500 people, permission must come from county authorities, if the audience is over 1000, permission must come from provincial authorities.

Even on an individual level, there are restrictions on religious practices and freedom. Although government officials maintain that it is legal to possess or display pictures of the Dalai Lama, authorities view possession of such photos as evidence of separatist charges. Therefore, it is taboo to circulate posters or propaganda related to the Dalai Lama or to even display of photographs of him.


There also exists a ban on including religion in the teaching syllabus as well as a ban on displaying religious shrines in the household. This has been implemented on the basis of fearing that this will foster linkages between Tibetans and the exiles.

In 2001, Hu Jintao, President of China, arrived in Lhasa, delivering a speech that boasted of the rights of the people in Tibet.

“Today, people of all ethnic groups in Tibet are fully enjoying political, economic, cultural and other rights, and have complete control of their destiny.”

Contrary to Hu Jintao’s claim, the people in Tibet are deprived religious rights as postulated in the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet. Justice has not been served since the invasion of the Chinese government and will not be until there is consistency between the promulgation and implementation of the law. Until then, Tibetans will continue to pray for freedom, pray for posterity, and pray for justice.
Friday, June 13, 2008

Article #5 from Volume 1, Issue 3: Your Media, Your Human Right


“Media Control in China”
Nari Corley-Wheeler

To mitigate international concern surrounding tightly controlled media policies, the Chinese Communist Party has pledged to loosen their iron grip on their state-run news publications before the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

However, in order to loosen their grip, they must tighten their reins. Recently, local and national journalists have faced mounting charges for ‘spreading rumors’ or violating codes of ‘news discipline.’

Journalists reporting on local and national issues are restricted from reporting news that is inconsistent with the ideologies of the Communist Party. Ironically though, recent intensified ‘crackdowns’ on local journalists has only resulted in an increase reporting on media rights by international publications.

Presently, journalists are barred from reporting against Communist propaganda, leaders, and internal healthcare violations. Sources divulging evidence of anti-foreign teachings, food safety scares, or the environmental crises, are generally discredited and punishable by the Communist Party.

State-run news publications are not taken lightly in China. Journalists forced to quit their jobs report that the news media encourages and endorses fabricated stories that are in line with the party’s political interests and strategies instead of real events.

Acting as the primary media division and authorized by the Communist Party, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) is the branch of governance that remains immensely indispensable to the government as it actively enforces media controls and censorship. As a de facto arm of the Communist Party of China, the CPD covertly and discriminately evaluates publications for reporting inconsistent with the ideals put forth by the Communist Party.

Prior to releasing newspapers, the CPD ensures that the papers carry the undertone consistent with Communist Party ideology, a sound representation of major political figures, and peaceful foreign engagements.

Asserting propaganda messages to the global landscape proves interesting when contrasted by human rights violation reports by international publications. Slight human rights violations that appear sporadically in international newspapers depict a vastly different Chinese landscape than the one revealed in Chinese state-run newspapers.

However, when human rights violations occur in mining towns, textile factories, or rural villages, readers cannot depend on the Chinese newspapers to cover topics regarding their falling standards of healthcare and their deep-seated inability to provide appropriate standards of living that the Communist ideology claims to insist upon for their citizens.

Displacing basic human rights for a strong and mobile economy, the Communist Party has little option to reveal their emerging environmental crises that afflicts the health of 1.2 billion individuals residing within their closed-media borders.

Further demonstrating their stronghold on the media, the Communist Party has engaged in another way to broaden media censorship – through the internet. In late August of 2007, the government enacted the search engines Google China and China Yahoo to remove ‘illegal and unhealthy content’ within a week of the announcement (Human Rights Watch).

Fearing embarrassment encouraged by internet bloggers and news sites, the government would rather censor and reduce media transparency rather than to admit to their faults.

Unfortunately, efforts to curtail media transparency will become increasingly difficult in an ever-globalizing world. Attempts to avert attention from inaccurate news reporting and methods of human rights violations to combat efforts to expose media truths will become paramount as China is socialized into international norms and regulations.

With the imminent arrival of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China will especially have to make grand alterations to their internal reality for the global audience.

Journalists from around the world will be closely observing the media climate in China and will return reporting an image of China that may be uncomfortably familiar to the Communist Party, but unfamiliar to the international community.

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